Richard Rorty’s Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality
Commentary by Aaron David

Following the philosopher Rabossi, Rorty believes that foundationalism
is outmoded and that we have moved beyond the
debate between Plato and Nietzsche regarding the question of
the ahistorical nature of human beings into a more efficient culture
of human rights. In light of human malleability, according
to Rorty, it is not sensible anymore to believe that there is an
ahistorical human nature; and even if there is an ahistorical human
nature, nothing in it “is relevant to our moral choices.”
We have grown to this point during the last two hundred years
through the progress of sentimental education. “This progress
consists in an increasing ability to see the similarities between
ourselves and people very unlike us as outweighing the differences.”
Drawing a connection to Rohinton Mistry’s A Fine Balance
can be seen as a test case for Rorty’s thesis about how sentimental
education is supposed to move us. Was I moved by Mistry’s
novel as Rorty thinks I should be? Certainly, but I think my
desire to spread human rights further is more powerful when it
is based on a more solid moral foundation in the Platonic and
Kantian spirit. I just do not see how it can be binding or even
more effective to “rely on the suggestion of sentiment rather
than on the commands of reason.”